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of	guanxi	 is	different	between	family	 firms	and	non-family	 firms.	This	article	reviews	relevant	research	 in	
this	stream	and	argues	that	the	practice	of	guanxi	in	family	firms	seems	to	be	healthier,	more	stable	and	with	
long-term	commitments.	In	contrast,	practice	of	guanxi	in	non-family	firms	seems	to	be	more	opportunistic,	













Unlike	 western	 advanced	 economies,	
Asian	 emerging	 markets	 are	 charac-
terized	 by	 inadequate	 development	 of	
institutional infrastructure, resulting in 
either	 the	 absence	 of,	 or	 weak	 legal	 sys-
tems	to	efficiently	enforce	contracts	(Fila-
totchev,	 Jackson  &	 Nakajima,	 2013).	 In	
this context, scholars argue that informal 
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institutions	are	often	more	important	than	
formal	ones	(Globerman,	Peng &	Shapiro,	
2011),	 and	 informal	 governance	 mecha-
nisms that derived from cultural values 
and	 social	 norms	 substitute	 for	 formal	
mechanisms	 in	 Asian	 emerging	 markets	
(Dinh &	Calabrò,	2019).	Among	informal	
governance	mechanisms	adopted	by	Asian	
firms,	 interpersonal	 relationships	 known	
as	guanxi	have	been	widely	discussed	and	
argued	 to	 be	 an	 efficient	 tool	 that	 helps	
firms	 reducing	 institutional	 uncertainty	
and transaction costs, enhancing partner-
ship	 effectiveness,	 and	 providing	 access	
to	diverse	resources	(Chen,	Chang &	Lee,	
2015;	 Sheng  &	 Mendes‐Da‐Silva,	 2014;	
yang &	wang,	2011;	Luo,	Huang &	wang,	
2012).	
Despite	 its	 functionally	 equivalent	
governance mechanism, majority of the 
literature on guanxi so far has paid little 
attention	 to	whether	 or	 not	 the	 develop-
ment and practice of guanxi is different 
between	 family	 firms	 and	 non-family	
firms	 (Dinh  &	 Calabrò,	 2019).	 Indeed,	
the mainstream literature on guanxi has 
primarily focused on its functional role 






goal of this article is to distinguish the 
development	 and	 use	 of	 guanxi	 between	




informal governance mechanism and help 
practitioners	 at	 individual	 and	 organiza-
tional levels use it more effectively. 
Thus,	 in	 order	 to	meet	 this	 goal,	 this	
article aims to disentangle this informal 
governance	mechanism	by	digging	deeper	
into guanxi’s cultural roots and its further-
ance/evolution	in	business	context	in	Asia	
especially	in	China	and	other	regions	and	
countries	 that	 influenced	 by	 Confucian-
ism, for instance, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Japan,	 Singapore,	 South	 Korea,	 Taiwan,	
and	Vietnam.	Drawing	upon	 the	 cultural	
and familial characteristics that constitute 
guanxi	 in	 Confucianism,	 and	 studies	 on	
“guanxi and firm performance”,	we	 argue	
that the development and use of guanxi 
in FFs is different from that in non-FFs. 
Indeed,	the	practice	of	guanxi	in	FFs	often	
appears	 to	 be	 healthier,	more	 stable,	 and	
with	long-term	commitments.	In	contrast,	
practice	of	guanxi	in	non-FFs	seems	to	be	
more opportunistic, detrimental, and time 
variant. 
The	rest	of	this	article	is	structured	as	
follows.	 The	 following	 section	 provides	
understanding on institutional anteced-
ents	 and	 governance	 role	 of	 guanxi.	 The	





This	 article	 employs	 narrative	 and	 criti-
cal	 review	 method	 of	 empirical	 research	
as	well	 as	 theoretical	 analysis	 of	 Chinese	




types of evidence from diverse methods 
used	in	reviewed	articles.	
Additionally,	 because	 this	 article	 is	 a	
perspective	 paper,	 critical	 review	 is	 valu-
able	for	discussing	the	evidence	and	con-
structing	 conceptual	 arguments	 (Podsa-
koff,	MacKenzie,	Lee &	Podsakoff,	2003).
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Institutional Antecedents 
of Guanxi and its Role as 
Governance Mechanism
Institutional Antecedents of Guanxi
In	 Chinese	 language,	 guanxi	 means	 “tie	
up”,	 “connect”	or	 “relationships”	 in	generic	
sense	between	two	or	more	persons	rooted	
deeply	 in	 Confucianism,	 an	 ancient	 Chi-
nese	philosophy	since	the	Han	dynasty	BC	
206  –	 AD	 220	 (Jacobs,	 Guopei  &	Herbig,	
1995).	The	 Confucian	 philosophy	 empha-





ingly,	 Confucianism	 assumes	 that	Chinese	
people	 live	 in	 an	 intricate	web	of	personal	
and	 social	 inter-connections	 and	 Chinese	
society	 has	 been	 functioning	 as	 clan-like	
networks	 (Chen &	Chen,	2004).	Such	net-
works	can	be	viewed	as	concentric	circles	in	
which	 family	 members	 including	 relatives	
are	at	the	core.	This	core	is	the	guanxi	base	
and	constitutes	family	guanxi.	Outer	circles	
including friends and classmates, neigh-
bours,	 colleagues,	 and	 pure	 acquaintances	
or	 social	 relations	 with	 no	 lasting	 nature	
are	 called	 acquaintance	 guanxi	 and	 stran-
ger	 guanxi	 respectively	 (yang,	 1995;	 yang,	
1994).	These	outer	circles	are	being	viewed	
as peripheral arranged in accordance to 
the distances of relationships and degrees 
of	 trusts	 (Luo,	 1997).	 Belonging	 to	 these	
networks	 allowed	 ancient	 Chinese	 people	




the level of trust among these people is also 
highest as compared to those at outer circles. 
Therefore,	 it	can	be	argued	that	guanxi	re-
lationships among people at the core of the 












hesitance or defence. 
This	 hierarchy	 of	 social	 relationship	
has	resulted	in	power	distance	in	Chinese	
social	 and	 organizational	 structure	 until	
today	 (Liu  &	 Liao,	 2013).	 In	 the	 hierar-
chical	 structure,	 people	 with	 power	 and	
resources	 are	 at	 the	 core	 (e.g.	 sovereign,	
key	decision	makers,	father).	On	the	other	
hand,	 as	 characterized	 by	 closed-system	
of	 relationships,	 ancient	 Chinese	 people	
emphasized	the	in-group	trust	and	loyalty,	
thus	 outsiders	 to	 a	 collective	 group	were	







or rely on his/her contacts at the core or 
nearest	 possible	 to	 the	 core	 to	 get	 things	
done	(Dinh &	Hilmarsson,	2020).
Overtime,	these	principles	of	relation-
ships	 have	 become	 the	 social	 framework	
and	 institutional	 system	 that	 guide	 Chi-
nese	 people’s	 behaviour	 including	 Chi-
nese	 overseas,	 and	people	 in	 other	Asian	
countries and regions that are culturally 
influenced	by	Confucianism	such	as	Hong	
Kong,	 Malaysia,	 Japan,	 Singapore,	 South	
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protection and market supporting insti-
tutions	in	Asian	emerging	markets,	 inter-




informal governance mechanism, guanxi 
relationships	 can	 be	 beneficial	 for	 firms	
in	different	ways.	The	most	common	ben-
efits	that	guanxi	offers	is:	access	to	critical	
information,	 diverse	 resources	 and	 busi-
ness opportunities; reduced unnecessary 
bureaucratic	 procedures	 and	 transaction	
costs,	 increased	partnership	effectiveness,	
and even legal protection in hostile en-
vironments	 (Tang,	 ye  &	 Zhou,	 2013;	 Qi,	
2013;	yeung &	Tung,	1996).	
Despite tremendous efforts of gov-
ernments	 in	 Asian	 emerging	 economies	
recently	in	enacting	various	laws	and	regu-
lations	to	improve	their	business	environ-
ments, the enforcement of these formal 
mechanisms	remains	weak	(Nguyen &	Van	
Dijk,	 2012).	Additionally,	 governments	 in	
Asian	emerging	economies	(e.g.	China	and	
Vietnam)	exercise	their	controlling	power,	
to a large extent, either through national 
planning initiatives on the allocation of 
critical	 resources	 or	 through	 state-owned	
enterprises	 (SOEs),	 including	 banks	 and	
often	in	favour	of	SOEs	(Guriev,	2004).	As	a	
result, private firms including FFs and non-
FFs	are	often	in	weaker	position	than	SOEs	
in gaining access to strategic resources for 
growth	and	may	 face	unnecessary	regula-
tions	 (red	 tape)	 or	 excessive	 tax	 burdens	
(Tang	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Furthermore,	 many	
Asian	 emerging	 economies	 are	 in	 transi-
tion from centrally planned economies to 
more	 literalized	market	economies	 result-
ing in constant institutional changes that 
causes high level of institutional uncer-
tainty	 (Bui &	Nunoi,	 2008).	Thus,	having	
guanxi	 networks	 with	 key	 governmental	
Korea,	 Taiwan,	 and	 Vietnam	 (Dinh  &	
Calabrò,	 2019).	 Although	 the	 structural	
make-up and the nature of the relation-
ships may have evolved since the time 
of	 Confucius,	 modern	 Chinese	 societies	
remain very much relationships oriented 
and	 interpersonal	 relationships	 (guanxi)	






other	words	 are	 used	 before	 it	 (-guanxi).	
For	example,	business	relationships	(shang	
wu	 guanxi),	 social	 relationships	 (she	 hui	
guanxi),	 husband-wife	 relationship	 (fu	 qi	
guanxi),	 or	 relationships	 among	 students	




In	 the	 context	 of	 business	 (shang	 wu	
guanxi),	guanxi	refers	to	business	relation-
ships	 that	 are	 built	 on	 personal	 relation-
ships at individual level rather than organi-
zational	 level	 because	 such	 relationships	
are	 nurtured	 by	 persons	 and	 not	 by	 the	
company	directly	(Dou &	Li,	2013).	Never-
theless, the concept and practice of guanxi 




erful strategic tool that helps firms maintain 
competitive advantages and achieve high 
economic	 performance	 (Luo	 et	 al.,	 2012;	
Arregle,	Hitt,	Sirmon &	Very,	2007).	
Guanxi as Informal Governance 
Mechanism
Due	 to	 the	 power	 distance	 in	 social	 and	
organisational structure, the lack of legal 
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officials	 (political	 guanxi/connections)	
can	 help	 FFs	 and	 non-FFs	 obtain	 critical	
information at early stage to reduce uncer-
tainty,	 better	 access	 resources	 (e.g.	 free	
land	 use,	 large	 bank	 loan,	 lower	 interest	
and	 tax	 rate),	 and	 face	 fewer	 disciplinary	
constraints	from	regulators	(yang &	wang,	
2011;	 Zhang  &	 Zhang,	 2006;	 Chung  &	
Ding,	 2010).	 Affiliated	 firms	 also	 benefit	
from	 extensive	 guanxi	 networks	 of	 their	
large	(parent)	business	groups	to	overcome	
market	imperfections	(Keister,	2002;	Ma &	
Lu,	 2005)	 and	 to	 access	 technological,	
financial, and human resources that other-
wise	might	not	be	possible	because	of	 the	




having	 good	 guanxi	 with	 local	 business	
partners	 also	 facilitates	 business	 expan-
sion and reduces information asymmetry 
and	 transaction	 costs	 (yen,	 Lin,	 Chen  &	
Huang,	 2015).	Good	 guanxi	 relationships	
with	 local	 business	 partners	 may	 help	
foreign firms access local market intelli-
gence,	 utilize	 the	 local	 partners’	 available	
resources, for instance, through produc-
tion	 or	 distribution	 channels	 to	 ease	 the	
expansion plans of foreign firms in host 
markets	(Cheng,	Su &	Zhu,	2012;	Cheung,	
Haw,	 Tan &	wang,	 2014).	 Local	 business	
partners also could introduce and engage 
foreign	 firms	 in	 their	 guanxi	networks	 so	
that foreign firms can gain more trust and 
business	 opportunities	 in	 host	 markets	
(Chen	et	al.,	2015).
It	 is	 undeniable	 that	 guanxi	 functions	
as an informal governance mechanism 
that	 helps	 facilitate	 business	 operations,	
open	 dialogues,	 acquire	 intelligence	 and	
resources,	as	well	as	necessary	legal	protec-
tion in institutionally challenging environ-
ments	in	Asian	emerging	markets.	
Guanxi Practices in FFs and non-
FFs
Although	 guanxi	 is	 a	 cultural	 phenom-
enon	 and	 originates	 from	 the	 Confucian	
legacy	 that	 emphasizes	 family	 values,	 in-
group trust and loyalty, research on this 
stream	 seems	 to	 overlook	 how	 guanxi	 is	
developed,	 maintained	 and	 used	 differ-
ently	 between	 FFs	 and	 non-FFs.	 In	 this	
section	we	review	and	discuss	how	guanxi	
is	 practiced	 between	 these	 two	 different	
firm	types	based	on	some	key	aspects	 in-





rooted	 in	 Confucian	 culture.	 Primary	
guanxi	 is	 formed	and	developed	within	a	
family	 encompassing	 of	 people	 who	 are	
related	to	each	other	by	blood	ties	or	kin-
ship	 (Dunning  &	 Kim,	 2007)	 so	 called	
family	guanxi.	Since	family	members	often	
occupy leadership position in their FF, it 
is argued that guanxi in FFs comes from 
the	owning	family	including	their	relatives	
who	 work	 in	 the	 firm.	 Although	 family	
managers also need to extend and cultivate 
guanxi	with	other	non-family	stakeholders	
to	acquire	external	resources	like	non-FFs	
do	 (Miller,	 Lee,	 Chang  &	 Breton-Miller,	
2009),	 family	 guanxi	 constitutes	 as	 ethi-







in non-FFs are simply non-family execu-
tives,	managers	 or	 other	 individuals	who	
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can	 be	 resource-rich	 thanks	 to	 their	 in-
terpersonal	relationships	outside	the	firm.	
This	distinct	feature	warrants	us	to	discuss	




social	 capital,	 in	which	 resources	derived	
from interpersonal relationships are valu-
able	 to	 the	 organization	 (Cao,	 Ding  &	
Zhang,	2016;	Carlisle &	Flynn,	2005).	How-
ever, it is important to note that guanxi re-




organizational	 goals	 (Fan,	 2002a;	Hwang,	
2012).	 Given	 the	 important	 role	 of	 fa-
cilitating	 business	 success,	 FFs	 consider	
guanxi	 as	 “specialized	asset”	 (Bennedsen,	
Fan,	Jian &	yeh,	2015)	and	use	their	own	
resources	(e.g.	time	and	effort)	to	develop,	
nurture and strengthen guanxi relation-
ships	 with	 other	 stakeholders	 (Dinh  &	
Hilmarsson,	 2020).	 Miller	 et	 al.	 (2009)	
found	 that	 family	 managers	 often	 build	
guanxi	with	their	employees	with	the	aim	




family managers tend to handle guanxi 








Particularly,	 in	 newly	 privatized	 SOEs,	
guanxi	between	managers	and	politicians	
is	 associated	 with	 over-investment,	 and	
it can lead to severe expropriation of mi-
nority	 shareholders’	 wealth	 (Braendle,	
Gasser &	Noll,	2005;	Cheung,	Jing,	Rau &	
Stouraitis,	 2005)	 due	 to	 the	 “grabbing	
hand”	of	controlling	shareholders	and	cor-
rupt	politicians	(Frye &	Shleifer,	1997).	
For FFs, the continuity of guanxi across 
generations is a key determinant of FF 
success	 and	 survival	 in	 Asian	 emerging	
markets.	 Thus,	 in	 order	 to	maintain	 and	
transfer	 such	 “specialized	 asset”	 to	 the	
next generations, family managers care-
fully incorporate this process in their suc-
cession	 plans.	 Dou	 and	 Li	 (2013)	 found	
that	guanxi	succession	process	in	FFs	was	
carefully conducted through four phases 
including preheating, triggering, readjust-
ing,	and	reconstructing.	Additionally,	each	
phase	 required	 performing	 some	 charac-
teristic tasks including the cross-genera-
tional teaching and learning of guanxi phi-
losophy, the deconstruction of the profile 
of	 guanxi	 networks,	 the	 introduction	 of	
the next generation to existing guanxi par-
ties, the cross-generational role readjust-
ment	in	guanxi	building	and	management	
(Dou &	Li,	2013).	This	guanxi	succession	
process is not only used to transfer family 
(and	 extended	 family)	 guanxi	 within	 the	
FF	but	also	to	identify	and	manage	trans-
ferability	 of	 non-family	 guanxi	 networks	
that	 family	 managers	 have	 built	 during	
their	 lifetime	career.	However,	we	do	not	
see this practice implemented in non-FFs. 
Indeed,	guanxi	in	non-FFs	is	argued	to	be	
non-transferable.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	
in non-FFs, it is dependent on individu-
als	as	quanxi	holders,	whether	or	not	they	
agree or are contracted to use their guanxi 
networks	for	organizational	goals.	Indeed,	
non-FFs can hire a guanxi-rich manager 
and often his/her guanxi is considered as 
a determinant of manager’ compensation 
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level	 (Ahlstrom,	 Bruton  &	 yeh,	 2007;	
young  &	 Tsai,	 2008).	 As	 a	 consequence,	
the	effect	of	guanxi	in	non-FFs	may	be	lost	
when	 the	 hired	manager	 leaves	 the	 firm.	
This	is	because	guanxi	comprises	personal	
relationships	and	it	needs	to	be	constantly	




in FFs is practiced intensively and more 
vertically	 from	 the	 guanxi	 base	 (inner	
concentric	 circles)	 among	 FFs	 especially	
within	 family	business	groups	 (Carney &	
Gedajlovic,	2003).	This	is	because	the	level	
of trust among FFs in the same family 
business	 groups	 is	 higher	 and	 stronger	
than	 that	 for	 outside	 firms	 (Lasserre  &	
Schūtte,	 1995).	 FFs	 tend	 to	 rely	 on	 their	
family	guanxi	when	exchanging	resources	
with	 other	 affiliated	 firms	 within	 family	
business	groups.	This	practice	allows	affil-
iated firms access greater pool of diverse 
resources including technological, finan-
cial and human capital; reduce transaction 
costs	and	institutional	uncertainty	in	Asian	
emerging	 markets	 (Cheung	 et	 al.,	 2014).
On	the	contrary,	it	is	often	seen	that	guanxi	
in	non-FFs	is	practised	more	horizontally	
by	 selecting	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 different	
professional managers, or resource-rich 
people	 e.g.	 industry	bureaucrats,	military	
and governmental officials, to help them 
acquire	 external	 strategic	 resources	 (Li,	





practice leads us to the next paragraph in 
which	we	 review	 and	 discuss	 further	 the	
nature and conditions of guanxi practice 
between	FFs	and	non-FFs.	
Nature and Conditions
Familism,	 a	 key	 value	 in	 the	 Confucian	
ethical system and a driver of family 
guanxi, distinguishes the nature of guanxi 
among FFs and non-FFs. Familism places 
the interests and values of the family as 
first	 and	 foremost	 and,	 at	 all	 times,	 such	
interests	 and	 values	 must	 be	 maintained	
and	 perpetuated	 (Ip,	 2008).	 The	 family-
first	mentality	reflects	the	Confucian	ethi-
cal	principles	that	require	individual	to	put	
his/her interests as secondary to the fam-
ily	interests	(Bedford,	2011).	Thus,	people	
within	family	guanxi	circle	are	obliged	to	




ily	 system	 and	 business	 system	 (Habber-
shon,	williams &	MacMillan,	2003).	As	a	
consequence,	 at	 organizational	 level,	 it	 is	
argued that family managers are prone to 
practice	 guanxi	 in	 accordance	with	 prin-
ciples	 of	 family	 guanxi.	 Indeed,	 family	
owners	are	willing	to	sacrifice	commercial	




characterized	 by	 blood	 ties,	 high	 level	 of	










utilitarian	 (Fan,	 2002b;	 Bedford,	 2011;	
Chen	 et	 al.,	 2013).	There	 is	 little	 trust	 or	
affective commitment in practicing guanxi 
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in non-FFs, and if any, it is purely utility 
driven	(Fan,	2002a).	Practice	of	guanxi	in	
non-FFs is more opportunistic in a rent-
seeking manner and is the product of 
contemporary socio-economic systems in 
which	firms	need	enhance	their	organiza-
tional social capital through individuals’ 
guanxi	 networks	 (yeung  &	 Tung,	 1996;	
yang &	wang,	2011).	The	main	thing	that	
matters to the parties involved is their 
own	 business	 interests	 and	 the	 utility	 of	
other	 party	 (Fock  &	 woo,	 1998).	 Thus,	
it	 is	 strictly	 reciprocal	 following	 seller-
buyer	bargaining	manner	that	is	reflected	
through	 e.g.	 labour	 or	 commercial	 con-
tracts	between	 involved	parties,	 in	which	
favours	 (resources)	 can	 be	 granted	 and	
rewards	(e.g.	salary,	commission,	or	other	





ble,	 and	with	 a	 longer-term	commitment	
as	compared	to	non-FFs	(Fan,	2002b).	As	
previously	 mentioned,	 Confucian	 ethical	





ning  &	 Kim,	 2007).	Thus,	 people	 within	
a	 family	 guanxi	 circle	 in	 FFs	 are	 obliged	
to pursue and protect the family values 
and	reputation	by	not	misusing	or	exces-
sively	 exploiting	 resources	 acquired	 from	
their	 guanxi	 networks	 (Dinh  &	 Calabrò,	
2019).	Indeed,	FFs	tend	to	handle	guanxi	
with	care	(Dou &	Li,	2013)	and	constantly	
develop	 intimate	 relationships	 with	 non-
family stakeholders including employees, 




that family managers are directly involved 
in	 running	 their	 business	 and	 cultivating	
guanxi	networks	indicates	a	strong	family	
commitment.	Thus,	these	stakeholders	see	




the process of cultivating and transferring 
guanxi	(Dou &	Li,	2013),	this	entrusts	FFs’	
partners	and	encourages	them	to	establish	
stronger guanxi ties and aim for long-term 
commitment	with	FFs	(Miller	et	al.,	2009).
Conversely	 guanxi	 practice	 in	 non-
FFs	 seems	 to	be	unstable	 and	contempo-
rary.	 Different	 from	 guanxi	 in	 FFs	 with	
direct family involvement, guanxi ties in 
non-FFs is purely utility driven, a deal of 
money	 and	 power,	 and	 is	 contract-based	
(Fan,	 2002b).	 Majority	 shareholders	 in	
non-FFs tend to opt for commercial and 
short-term	benefits	and	excessively	exploit	
resources	 acquired	 from	 contractual	
guanxi	 (Liu	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Sun	 et	 al.,	 2016;	
Sun	et	al.,	2011),	and	in	many	cases	leading	
to	severely	expropriating	benefits	of	other	
stakeholders	 (Fan	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Cheung	 et	
al.,	 2005).	 yet,	 guanxi	 practice	 in	 non-
FFs	could	be	a	one-off	case,	and	once	the	
parties have already achieved their goals, 
there is neither guarantee nor commit-
ment	to	maintain	such	guanxi	ties	(Luo	et	
al.,	2012).	In	fact,	guanxi	in	non-FFs	seems	
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Thus,	the	departure	of	a	hired	manager	is	
likely to result in the loss of the guanxi that 
the	 manager	 brought	 into	 the	 company	
(wee &	Combe,	2009).	
Conclusions
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 review	
and	 discuss	 the	 different	 practices	 of	
guanxi	between	FFs	and	non-FFs.	Based	
on some key aspects including the origins 
of guanxi, development and usage, nature 
and	conditions,	quality	and	durability,	we	
argue	 that	 the	practice	of	 guanxi	 is	 sub-
stantially	different	between	FFs	and	non-
FFs. Guanxi as practiced in FFs seems to 
be	 healthier	more	 stable	 and	 long	 term.	
In	 contrast	 such	 practices	 in	 non-FFs	
are	 often,	 according	 to	 the	 reviewed	 lit-
erature,	used	in	a	more	detrimental	way,	
unstable	and	with	short	 term	benefits	 in	
mind. Furthermore, guanxi practice in 
FFs	seems	 to	be	more	stable	and	obliga-





important for practitioners in different 
ways.	 First,	 despite	 the	 improvement	
in the institutional environment, social 





tively, parties involved need to under-
stand its characteristics and nature. Man-
agers	in	non-FFs	may	want	to	learn	from	
their	 family	 counterparts	 how	 guanxi	
is practiced in order to convert these 
individual	 social	 networks	 into	 organi-
zational	 capital	 in	 a	more	 effective	 way.	
Second, despite variety of guanxi types 
and its practices, practitioners should 
note	that	true	guanxi	cannot	be	managed	
or	controlled	by	systems,	document,	and	
procedures.	 It	 is	 personal	 relationship	
and	 is	nurtured	by	 accumulated	 feelings	
and emotions through close personal 
interactions. Finally, understanding and 
practicing	 guanxi	 properly	will	 facilitate	
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Skirtingai	 nuo	 išsivysčiusių	 Vakarų	 šalių	 ekono-
mikos,	 Azijos	 besivystančioms	 rinkoms	 paprastai	
būdinga	 nepakankama	 institucinės	 infrastruktūros	
plėtra,	 dėl	 kurios	 arba	 nėra	 teisinių	 sistemų,	 kad	
būtų	 galima	 veiksmingai	 vykdyti	 sutartis,	 arba	 jos	
yra silpnos. Mokslininkai teigia, kad neformalios 
institucijos	 dažnai	 yra	 svarbesnės	 nei	 formalios,	 o	
Trung Quang DINH, Hilmar Þór HILMARSSON
ASMENINIAI SANTYKIAI KAIP NEFORMALUS VALDYMO MECHANIZMAS: 
AR SKIRIASI ŠEIMOS IR NE ŠEIMOS VERSLO ĮMONIŲ VALDYMAS?
S a n t r a u k a 
neoficialūs	 valdymo	 mechanizmai,	 atsirandantys	




nami	 „guanxi“,	 plačiai	 analizuojami.	Teigiama,	 kad	
jie	 yra	 veiksminga	 priemonė,	 padedanti	 įmonėms	
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ankstesniais tyrimais apie guanxi	praktiką	ir	įmonių	
veiklą, galima daryti išvadą, kad guanxi praktikos 
vystymasis	 ir	 naudojimas	 šeimos	 verslo	 įmonėse	
skiriasi	nuo	ne	šeimos	verslo	įmonių.	Iš	tiesų	guanxi 
praktika	šeimos	verslo	įmonėse	yra	sveikesnė,	stabi-





tus,	 padidinti	 partnerystės	 efektyvumą	 ir	 palengvi-
nanti	prieigą	prie	įvairių	išteklių.




ir šeimos santykiuose, teigiama, kad guanxi praktika 
skirtinga	šeimos	ir	ne	šeimos	verslo	įmonėse.	Nepai-
sant	 to,	 pagrindinėje	 literatūroje	 apie	 guanxi dau-
giausia	dėmesio	skiriama	jos	funkciniam	vaidmeniui	
ir,	savaime	suprantama,	kad	visų	Azijos	firmų	tipų,	
guanxi yra universalus. 
Šio	straipsnio	tikslas –	atskirti	guanxi vystymą-
si	ir	naudojimą	šeimos	verslo	įmonėse	ir	ne	šeimos	
verslo	 įmonėse.	Šeimos	 ir	ne	 šeimos	verslo	 įmonių	
guanxi	 praktikos	 skirtumai	 gali	 padėti	 atskleisti	 šį	
neformalų	 valdymo	 mechanizmą	 ir	 suteikti	 žinių,	
kaip šią praktiką taikyti tiek individualiu, tiek ir or-
ganizaciniu	 lygmeniu.	 Šiame	 straipsnyje	 siekiama	
atskleisti guanxi	(kaip	neformalaus	valdymo	mecha-
nizmo)	praktiką,	gilinantis	į	guanxi	kultūrines	šaknis	
ir	jo	evoliuciją	verslo	kontekste	Azijoje,	ypač	Kinijoje	
